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Abstract
Whilst there is widespread agreement in scientific and academic circles, and increasingly in the more
radical reaches of a whole range of social and political spheres, that the existential challenges posed 
by the Anthropocene require nothing less than a wholesale re-fashioning of the human-environment
paradigm; how this might be achieved remains, at best, highly debatable. The exploitative archetype 
of mastery over nature is deeply ingrained within our species’ psyche and praxis, and it has, on 
balance, served us well for most of our evolutionary development. Where human behaviour has 
imposed costs on the natural world, the latter has, broadly speaking, long proved remarkably 
resilient in absorbing much of the impact of our excesses. Nonetheless, all indications are that this 
will not be the case in perpetuity and that, as we transgress an increasing number of crucial 
planetary boundaries, our habitual ways of thinking and behaviours represent an existential threat 
to at least our own species, if not the biosphere as a whole. Our increasing (if still woefully 
incomplete) knowledge how planetary systems function and the significance of the impacts of 
human activities upon them could, if acted upon swiftly, and with a thorough-going commitment 
that recognises the true position of humans within the biosphere and the consequent imperative to 
curb our own over-indulgence, represent our best chance to continue to flourish as a species in a 
viable global context. Achieving such a fundamental alteration in our ontological perspective would 
arguably represent a seismic shift in human affairs on a par with the Enlightenment. In the past we 
have enjoyed the luxury of experiencing such change as gradual evolution, but current conditions 
require our next perspectival shift to be achieved with an unprecedented degree of urgency. This 
chapter considers one area in which we might trial our ability to adopt reasoned behavioural change 
that short-circuits norms that have ultimately become counterproductive: our relationship to 
ecosystems. This is the area where the human-nature nexus and the implications of its current 
malignant pathology are arguably at their most immediate. A plethora of potential routes have been 
identified in order to recraft the terms of this aspect of our interconnection with nature in a more 
sustainable fashion. This chapter will look specifically at the voguish but vexed concept of 
ecosystems services, arguing that, as currently envisaged, rather than representing innovation, it 
pursues the paradigm of mastery to its logical and damning conclusion.  The chapter will briefly 
consider the pros and cons of applying selected rights-based approaches (representative of an 
important strand in current thinking in this area) in the context of ecosystems services as correctives 
to this course. The rights approaches considered include: (likely prevailing) individual property 
rights; collective human rights; and ‘rights for nature’ archetypes. The chapter will conclude by 
considering the idea that, while rights discourse has something to offer in this context, where human
attitudes and behaviour are in play, absent the crucial counter-point of an ethic of human 
responsibility, it cannot offer more than a partial solution to the conundrum of how to fashion a 
sustainable version of the human-environment bond.
(H) The Paradigm of Mastery and its Consequences
The current prevailing paradigm shaping the human/nature relationship, while it has until quite 
recently, served (or at least appeared) to promote human flourishing, has now reached the point 
where it must be regarded as inherently unsustainable. In recognising the shift to the Anthropocene,
1 While there are numerous (indigenous/religious) world views that situate humanity as part of nature, rather 
than as its master, these currently represent counter-hegemonic perspectives, rather than accepted orthodoxy
see, for example, John A. Grim, Indigenous traditions and ecology: the interbeing of cosmology and community
(Harvard University Press 2001).
1 See the work of the Stockholm Resilience Centre on planetary boundaries, which focuses on those areas of 
the biosphere that most directly support human life, and which are subject to varying degrees of threat, 
notably W. Steffen et al., ‘Planetary Boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing planet’ (2015) Science Vol. 347 no. 6223 15 January 2015, DOI: 10.1126/science.1259855.
1 See Alan Weisman, The World Without Us (Virgin Books 2008) which suggests that, absent humanity, life on 
Earth would continue, though potentially in radically different fashion.
1 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (Routledge 1993).
1 Ibid, Chapter 2.
1 Ibid, 41.
1 Ibid, 4.
1 Christopher D.  Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing – Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects’ 45 (1972) 
Southern California Law Review 450, 463.
1 Plumwood n4, 5.
1 Jutta Heckhausen, ‘Evolutionary perspectives on human motivation’ 43.6 The American Behavioral Scientist 
(2000) 1015, 1023
1 Ibid 1024.
we are coming to understand that our cosmology, the dominant1 epistemology founded upon it, and
resulting global praxis, has set us on a trajectory that is changing the face of the biosphere to the 
point that it poses multiple, potentially existential, threats to our species,1 and is re-shaping the 
nature of life itself.1 Critique of this state of affairs is ubiquitous; here though, discussion will draw 
on ecofeminist scholarship, and in particular the germinal work of Val Plumwood  on what she termsthe ‘paradigm of mastery’.1 Central to Plumwood’s analysis for present purposes is the application of
the prevailing post-Enlightenment Western philosophical conception of dualism1 to delineate, 
differentiate, and distinguish, between (human) culture and nature. In this context, she points to the
centrality of ‘denied dependency’1 in the human/nature relationship. In sum, the approach 
separates the realm of the human/master and reason from environment/nature, whereby:
To be defined as ‘nature’ …  is to be defined as a terra nullius, a resource empty of its own 
purposes or meanings, and hence available to be annexed for the purposes of those 
supposedly identified with reason or intellect …1
Law has been profoundly implicated in this annexation of nature to human purposes. As Stone 
observes, natural objects:
… have traditionally been regarded by the common law, and even by all but the most recent legislation, as objects for man to conquer and master and use … and even where natural objects are conserved this is done ‘for us’.1
The paradigm of mastery is characterised by Plumwood as invoking a ‘… multiple, complex cultural identity of the master formed in the context of class, race species and gender domination …’1 and for
present purposes it essentially casts the environment/nature as inherently inferior and a means to 
privileged humanity’s ends, rendering it ripe for what is assumed to be self-evidently justified and 
thus largely unquestioned exploitation. Interestingly, psychology refers to the ‘mastery perception’ as a motivation for active attempts to govern one’s environment1 but – worryingly in the context of 
ecological crisis - points to the fact that if control goals are not attained, disengagement results (in 
order to conserve physical and - in humans – emotional resources).1 We can now understand the 
pursuit of the paradigm of mastery as a form of malignant pathology, the adverse consequences of 
which for the environment, are amply evidenced in resource depletion, pollution, ecosystem and 
1 Steffen et al. n2.
1 Val Plumwood: ‘Ecological Ethics from rights to recognition: multiple spheres of justice for humans, animals and nature.’ in Nicholas Low (ed.) Global Ethics and Environment (Routledge 1999) 197.
1 See, for example, Donald A. Hantula, ‘Evolutionary Psychology and Consumption’ 20.9 Psychology & 
Marketing (2003) 757 and George Marshall, Don’t Even Think About It: Why Our Brains Are Wired to Ignore 
Climate Change (Bloomsbury 2014).
1 Plumwood, n4, 59-64.
1 Plumwood, n4, 67.
1 See, for example, discussion of developments in gender equality and abolishing slavery as discussed in Stone 
n8. 
ultimately even biospheric disruption, and all too apparent.1 Less discussed, and little investigated 
but arguably no less important are the consequences of enjoying the ultimately illusory position of 
mastery for humanity as a species: treating nature as a mere means to human ends has led us  to 
develop a finite and ultimately erroneous sense of god-like superiority and as we enter the 
Anthropocene, the moral and physical toxicity of this is becoming increasingly evident.
Our now rapidly emerging scientific understanding of the complexities of the functioning of the 
biosphere and of the existence of systemic planetary boundaries mean that we no longer have any 
excuse for viewing the paradigm of mastery as anything more than an illusion founded on self-
serving delusion. As Plumwood points out, we are well aware that the biosphere is no mere ‘background part of our field of action or subjectivity’,1 and ecology has (re)introduced us to the 
profound knowledge that that we are intimately enmeshed in nature, rather than separate from, or 
in any way above it. While these are things that on one level we know, we have yet to truly grasp 
their import1 and express this centrally in the way that we conduct ourselves vis-à-vis the 
environment. Rather, we have made comparatively minor adjustments to some of our more 
egregiously damaging activities under the auspices of environmental law, but these have in not 
altered the fundamental underlying paradigm of mastery. Dis/replacing the paradigm will be 
challenging, for as Plumwood convincingly argues, ending the systemic bifurcation of dualism and 
according value to the other cannot be addressed by mere merger or even reversal of current 
approaches1 – something much more ambitious is required, entailing: ‘… recognition of a complex, 
interacting pattern of both continuity and difference’.1
When applied to the human/nature relationship, this observation enables us to garner important 
insights: in terms of continuity, it acknowledges that humans are undoubtedly part of nature, and 
indeed intimately and entirely enmeshed within it; at the same time, in terms of difference, humans 
are distinct from the rest of nature in our ability to manipulate natural systems on a variety of scales 
from local to, now, planetary. In some ways, locally, and in the short term, humanity has been able 
to sway nature our own ends (though not entirely and with unintended consequences and 
externalities); it is however now becoming clear with the advent of the Anthropocene, that the 
cumulative spatial and temporal impacts of human activity pose such substantial threats that we 
urgently need to rethink our place in the biosphere.  This brings us to the central question: what 
would it require to motivate the shift that this would need to engage in the dynamics and 
characterisation of the human/nature relationship? Human history has shown that societal (and 
legal) responses to moral/ethical arguments for altering key aspects of human behaviour are 
comparatively slow to develop, partial in their draw, and ultimately require legal compulsion for 
their realisation.1 When we do respond to such imperatives, as Delgado puts it:
... we are almost inevitably drawn to doomed, moderate approaches ... when society needs 
more sweeping, ambitious ones. We resist precisely the medicine that could save us. We 
turn to strong solutions only when it is either too late, or when our thinking has advanced so
far that the solutions seem commonplace and tame.1
1 R. Delgado, ‘Our Better Natures: A revisionist View of Joseph Sax’s Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform’ 44.6 Vanderbilt Law Review 1209, 1212.
1 Jedediah Purdy, ‘Our Place in the World: A New Relationship for Environmental ethics and Law’ 62.4 Duke LJ 
(2013) 857.
1 Discussed in Luis A. Vivanco, Green Encounters: Shaping and Contesting Environmentalism in Rural Costa Rica
(Berghahn Books 2006) notably at 54 et seq.
1 Carl Folke, Steve Carpenter, Brian Walker, Martin Scheffer, Thomas Elmqvist, Lance Gunderson and C.S. Holling, ‘Regime Shifts, Resilience, and Biodiversity in Ecosystem Management’ 35 (2004) Annu. Rev. Ecol. Evol.
Syst. 557, 558.
1 B. Kaldis, ‘Could the Environment Acquire its Own Discourse?’ History of Human Sciences (2003) Vol 16.3 73.
1 Ibid, 74.
1 See, for example, Daniel A Farber, Ecopragmatism, University of Chicago Press 1999, examining the interface 
between economics, science and environmental regulation.
1 Heir apparent to the more rudimentary modelling approaches pioneered by the Club of Rome - Donella H. 
Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, William W. Behrens III, The Limits to Growth (Universe Books 
1972).  
This is clearly applicable to the current context, wherein it may be argued that, in the past, we could 
allow ourselves the luxury of shifting perspectives through societal evolution, rather than revolution:
in the Anthropocene, in a world of relatively rapid human-induced change, tipping points and 
interconnected/systemic threats this is no longer be the case. Swift change requires a rapid 
response. So, if we cannot fashion an effective morally-prompted new relationship between 
environmental ethics, law and societal practice, desirable in principle as this may be,1 can practical considerations – and scientific evidence furnished by ecology (itself the subject of rapid and radical 
development1) - supply the deficit?
In this context, as Folke et al. observe:
The old way of thinking implicitly assumes a stable and infinitely resilient environment, a 
global steady state. The new perspective recognizes that resilience can be and has been 
eroded and that the self-repairing capacity of ecosystems should no longer be taken for 
granted.1
One potential response to this knowledge would be (the admittedly hugely challenging) 
development of ‘ecological thinking’:
… perhaps the first subject-matter that transcends or shatters discourse boundaries and 
strains both imagination and human powers when selecting between conceptual 
frameworks …1
Kaldis questions whether the ‘disciplinary borrowing’ that commonly features in emerging ecological
thinking discourse is ‘… merely unfortunate? Or is it, rather, logically inescapable?’, seeing it as an 
inevitable route to social constructionism and anthropocentrism.1 I would argue, in common with 
eco-pragmatists,1 that given the pan-dimensional issues involved, disciplinary borrowing is inevitable– but that it is also desirable, though requiring careful handing in order to avoid the mere absorption
of ecological insights into current discourse, rather than their application prompting a 
transformation therein. One consequence of the need to develop ecological thinking is that 
emerging scientific discourse at the very frontiers of the human/environment interface is 
increasingly being brought to the fore in informing discussion of the hard choices that we face. The 
influential work of the Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC) on planetary boundaries is prominent in 
this regard.1  Of particular interest in the current context is the holistic, systemic, and, biosphere-
based approach being adopted by the SRC - the Earth System perspective - to evaluating the impacts
1 J. Rockström et al., Planetary boundaries: exploring the safe operating space for humanity 14.2 Ecology and
Society (2009) 32 http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art32/J accessed 27 April 2016 and Steffen et
al. n2.
1 See, for example, Report of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA), Ecosystems and Human Wellbeing – Synthesis Report (2005) online http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf 
(accessed 27 April 2016).
1 Online at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ecosystem.
1 Folke et al. n21, 573.
1 Ibid.
of human activity on the environment. As befitting the science of the Anthropocene, human activity 
is viewed as an integral part of the Earth System, which is defined as:
… the integrated biophysical and socioeconomic processes and interactions (cycles) among 
the atmosphere, hydrosphere, cryosphere, biosphere, geosphere, and anthroposphere (human enterprise) in both spatial—from local to global—and temporal scales, which 
determine the environmental state of the planet within its current position in the universe. 
Thus, humans and their activities are fully part of the Earth System, interacting with other 
components.1
When applied to the nine planetary boundaries identified by the SRC, namely: the stratospheric 
ozone layer; biodiversity; chemicals dispersion; climate change; ocean acidification; freshwater 
consumption and the global hydrological cycle; land system change; nitrogen and phosphorus inputs
into the biosphere and oceans; and atmospheric aerosol loadings – it is clear that the planetary 
system is under operating under an unprecedented slew of multidimensional, interactive, and 
anthropogenic, pressures.  It is clear that, if these pressures are being made manifest at the 
planetary/biospheric level, they are also being experienced in the ecosystems which comprise much 
of it.
(H) The Human/Nature Relationship and Ecosystems
Individual ecosystems represent the most immediate manifestation of the human/nature nexus and 
therefore provide an excellent glimpse into the state, character, and viability of the human/nature relationship – and they are of course hugely significant in  their own right in the current, seemingly 
unending, cycle of environmental degradation.1 Ecosystems may be defined as: ‘the complex of a community of organisms and its environment functioning as an ecological unit’.1 Our modern 
understanding of ecosystems, as indicated above, encapsulates humanity within this ‘community of 
organisms’. It also acknowledges that ‘… regime shifts in ecosystems are, to a large extent, driven by human actions’.1 Managing the human/ecosystem interface (more accurately expressed than the 
usual description of managing ecosystems) has therefore come to be a pressing issue and is focussed
on a range of human activities ranging from: ‘top-down’ (encompassing the products of deliberate 
action); to ‘bottom up’ (encompassing inadvertent impacts of human activity); and ‘altering disturbance regimes’.1
Whilst current discussion of the specific human/ecosystem interface is dominated by Ecosystem 
Services Approaches (ESAs) which we will consider shortly, these are is located in the broader 
ecology-driven approach that emerged in the conception of Ecosystem Based Management (EBM) of
terrestrial environments in the 1960s. EBM may be defined as: ‘comprehensive and integrative 
management decisions and actions in relation to ecosystem dynamics and the provision of 
interconnected ecosystem services, or human benefits.’1 The concept of EBM with its strong  
management bent,1 despite its nomenclature, constitutionally tends to the prioritisation of human 
1Crow White, Christopher Costello, Bruce E. Kendall and Christopher J. Brown, ‘The value of coordinated 
management of interacting ecosystem services’, 15.6 Ecology Letters (2012) 509, 509.
1 See Kaldis n22, 85 on the orientation of management approaches.
1 MEA, n27.
1 P. Evans, ‘Reclaiming the Language’ in Caught by the River: On Nature: Unexpected Ramblings on the British 
Countryside HarperCollins 2011, 107.
1 Robert Constanza et al., ‘Changes in the global value of ecosystem services’ 26 Global Environmental Change 
(2014) 152, 153.
1Jan McP. Dick, Rognvald I. Smith, and E. Marian Scott, ‘Ecosystem Services and Associated Concepts’, 22 
Environmetrics (2011), 598.
1Ibid.
1 For the sake of practicality, discussion here will focus specifically on the synthesis report drawn from these: 
The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Mainstreaming the Economics of Nature: A Synthesis of the 
Approach, Conclusions and Recommendations of TEEB, (TEEB Synthesis) (2010) at www.teebweb.org (accessed
25/10/11) which provides an overview of the work as a whole.
1 Discussed in K. Morrow, ‘Rio +20, the Green Economy and Re-orienting Sustainable Development’ 14.4 
Environmental Law Review (2012) 279.
1   R i o  + 2 0  O u t c o m e  D o c u m e n t ,  A / R E S / 6 6 / 2 8 8 ,  T h e  F u t u r e  W e  W a n t  o n l i n e  h t t p s : / / d o c u m e n t s - d d s - 
n y . u n . o r g / d o c / U N D O C / G E N / N 1 1 / 4 7 6 / 1 0 / P D F / N 1 1 4 7 6 1 0 . p d f ? O p e n E l e m e n t  a c c e s s e d  2 7  A p r i l  2 0 1 6 ,  
p a r a  9 1 .  U N G A  R E S  7 0 / 1 .  T r a n s f o r m i n g  o u r  w o r l d :  t h e  2 0 3 0  A g e n d a  f o r  S u s t a i n a b l e  D e v e l o p m e n t  ( T h e  
S u s t a i n a b l e  D e v e l o p m e n t  G o a l s )  o n l i n e  
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priorities.  The conception of ESAs as an element of EBM, which further enhances certain human 
priorities in this context, emerged in scientific literature in the 1980s, rising to prominence by the 
late 1990s. The UN’s Millennium Ecosystem Assessment1 (MEA) brought the concept to global 
prominence. It identified four categories of ‘ecosystem services’, namely: provisioning; regulating; 
cultural; and supporting. The signifying language of ‘service’ is crucial - as the: ‘… words we use to describe things are also the way we value them’;1 in this case value being explicitly based on the 
delivery of human well-being. The spectrum of services involved represents the complex and 
challenging mix of quantitative and qualitative elements that need somehow to be effectively 
combined in order to meet the multi-dimensional demands of EBM. The attraction of ESAs from a 
management perspective, as described by Constanza et al., lies in the recognition that:
Sustaining and enhancing human well-being requires a balance of all our assets – individual 
people, society, the built economy, and ecosystems. The reframing of the way we look at “nature” is essential to solving the problem of how to build a sustainable and desirable 
future for humanity.1
That said, while ESAs ostensibly function as a tool within EBM, the manner in which they are 
deployed in practice and the degree of prominence accorded to them vis-à-vis other components of 
EBM is of central importance. At a superficial level the conceptual origins of the concept of ‘ecosystem services’ in a science-driven model of EBM1 appear to be at least partially ecocentric - 
invoking the concept of the ecosystem, of which humanity is a part, as the framing for protection. In 
real terms however currently ESAs are driven by economics rather than science.1 The explicit 
harnessing of ESAs to economics, in effect stressing ‘services’ above ‘ecosystems’ is a deliberate 
policy choice, reflecting dominant social mores. Nowhere is this bent more clearly exemplified than 
in the six reports on ‘The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity’ (TEEB).1 These brought 
consideration of the valuation of ecosystems into the mainstream in international affairs, and 
formed a central plank of the wider ‘green economy’ initiative in the run up to the UNCSD (Rio+20) 
in 2012. Despite a somewhat lukewarm reception for the concept of the green economy in general 
at the conference,1 the ESA strand of the initiative seems to have a sustained momentum of its 
own.1
f r e q u e n t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  e c o s y s t e m s ,  r e f e r r i n g  t o  e c o s y s t e m  s e r v i c e s  i n  G o a l  1 5 . 1 ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  
c o n t i n u i n g  c u r r e n c y  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t ,  c o m m i t t i n g  t o :  ’ B y  2 0 2 0 ,  e n s u r e  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i o n ,  r e s t o r a t i o n  a n d  
s u s t a i n a b l e  u s e  o f  t e r r e s t r i a l  a n d  i n l a n d  f r e s h w a t e r  e c o s y s t e m s  a n d  t h e i r  s e r v i c e s  … ’ . 
1 TEEB Synthesis n38 3.
1 Ibid, 4.
1 Ibid, 12
1 Ibid.
1 Ibid.
1 Ibid, 7.
1 Nükhet Yilmaz Turgut, ‘The influence of ecology on environmental law: challenges to the concept of 
traditional law’, 10 Environmental Law Review (2008) 112.
1 TEEB Synthesis, n38, 7-8.
While the TEEB initiative was hosted by UNEP, it was initiated by the G8+5 as a part of the antidote 
to the burgeoning global economic crisis. To this end, it aspired to tackle the ‘economic invisibility’ ofmost ecosystem services and ‘mainstream’ the environment into financial services by incorporating the ‘values of nature’ into societal decision-making processes at all levels.1  This ostensibly 
acknowledged the centrality of ecosystem health to a viable economy. Furthermore, in positing a 
more economically grounded approach to environmental protection, it sought to:
… provide a bridge between the multi-disciplinary science of biodiversity and the arena of 
international and national policy as well as local government and business practices.1
Furthermore, the TEEB characterised the established relationship between humanity and nature as one of ‘self-destructiveness’1 and viewed attributing monetary value to ecosystem services as a 
potent corrective to it, stating that: 
Valuation can act as a powerful form of feedback, a tool for self-reflection, which helps us 
rethink our relation to the natural environment and alerts us to the consequences of our 
choices and behaviour on distant places and people. 1
The TEEB further envisaged:
... the introduction of mechanisms that incorporate the values of ecosystems into decision 
making through incentives and price signals. … It needs to come along with reinforcing 
rights over natural resources and liability for environmental damage.1 (emphasis in the 
original)
Thus the TEEB advocated the adoption of ESAs, which it defined as evaluating; ‘flows of value to 
human societies as a result of the state and quantity of natural capital’.1 Taken in context, it is clear 
then that, despite its ‘ecosystem’ nomenclature, what was being advocated by ESAs here was not 
only (like EBM) fundamentally anthropocentric but also primarily economic in approach.1 This has 
appeal, notably in seeking to address market failures, specifically: the fact that pricing of ecosystem 
services had tended to be confined to use values (e.g. provisioning services) with non-use values 
(e.g. cultural services) rarely being considered in monetary terms; and seeking to encapsulate 
indirect use values (regulating services) which are only beginning to be assigned economic value, 
though they in fact make the most significant contribution to human well-being.1 There are however 
significant problems attached to the TEEB’s conception of ESAs, not least those related to valuation. 
In principle, pricing ecosystem services arguably further commodifies/objectifies the natural world, 
reinforcing the paradigm of mastery. Furthermore, focussing narrowly on economics reinforcing the 
dominance of market-based ideologies and ultimately represents a damagingly reductionist attempt 
1 Mark Sagoff, ‘On the value of natural ecosystems: The Catskills parable’, Politics and the Life Sciences 21 
(2002), 19-25.
1 G.C. Daily et al., ‘The Value of Nature and the Nature of Value’, Science, 289, Issue 5478 (2000), 395.
1 S.B. Banerjee, ‘Who Sustains Whose Development? Sustainable Development and the Reinvention of Nature’,
24(1) Organization Studies (2003) 143, 156.
1 Ibid, 153.
1 E.O. Wilson, The Diversity of Life (Harvard University Press 1992) 271.
1 TEEB Synthesis n38, 25.
1 Ibid, 12.
1 Elena M. Bennett et al., ‘Linking biodiversity, ecosystem services, and human well-being: three challenges for 
designing research for sustainability’ 14 Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability (2015) 76, 77.
1 David K Loomis, Shona K. Paterson, ‘Human dimensions indicators of coastal ecosystem services: A hierarchical perspective’ 44 Ecological Indicators 44 (2014) 63.
1 See, for example, Herbert W. Schroeder, ‘Place experience, gestalt, and the human-nature relationship’ 
Journal of Environmental Psychology 27 (2007) 293.
at the quantification of qualitative considerations.1 Even if these objections are overlooked as 
idealistic/ideological, and we accept the assertion that engaging with the market is necessary in 
order to protect ecosystems, the practical problem of ascribing appropriate monetary value to 
ecosystem services remains. In order for ESAs to improve upon current approaches, they would 
need to attain a degree of accuracy in valuing the services in question – otherwise they will simply 
serve to add spurious legitimacy to erroneous assumptions. At a minimum this would require them 
to be founded on a thorough, science-based, understanding of ecosystems coupled with due 
consideration of human systemic impacts on and interactions with them. The difficulties of capturing
value in this context are exacerbated by the fact that our baseline knowledge of ecosystems 
generally,1 let alone ecosystem services, is poor, with our limited understanding of ecosystem 
function and maintenance, critical thresholds, uncertainty, and precaution, all raising serious 
concerns. Additionally, arguments for the valorisation of ESAs would be considerably more 
convincing if our well-established attribution of economic value to the considerably more 
straightforward category of environmental goods was such as to ensure their sustainable use. In 
fact, experience has shown that : ‘... admitting the traditional economic valuation methods almost always undervalues biological diversity ...’.1 Furthermore,  expanding the role of  the market in such contexts only provides protection to the environment ‘… unless degrading it becomes more 
profitable.1 In light of this, sending out inaccurate price signals on ESAs would have potentially 
disastrous consequences, yet proponents argue for their potential draw income from ‘wildlands’ 
through giving the invisible hand of the market a ‘green thumb’. 1
Such issues notwithstanding, the TEEB asserts that the process of pricing ESAs: ‘... should be uncontroversial for many ecosystem services, especially at the local scale’1 yet at the same time it 
acknowledges that the process presents enormous challenges. 1 Bennett engages with the latter 
noting that, while our knowledge base is developing:
… despite extensive work on ecosystem services in recent decades, our understanding of 
their ecological foundation, their impacts on human well-being, and our knowledge about 
how to govern their benefits remains insufficient.1
Our fragmented knowledge base was initially largely confined to conceptual consideration of 
interactions between hard science (incomplete it itself) and economics, which, while challenging in 
itself, in no wise reflected the full complexity of the issues involved. Latterly, the social sciences1 and 
empirical study1 are beginning to play a more prominent role in this regard, countering the 
established dominance of scientific and economic information sets. While on one level this is all to 
the good, it is also the case that, as the range of inputs increases, the challenges posed by cross 
disciplinary dialogue become, in anything, more vivid.1
1 See. For example, Loomis and Paterson, n57, and Bennett n56.
1 TEEB Synthesis, n38, 4.
1 Stone, n8, 476.
1 Sam Adelman, ‘Rio+20: sustainable injustice in a time of crisis’ 4.1 (2013) Journal of Human Rights and the 
environment 6, 10.
1 See, with regard to the EUETS, Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch) in 
which the Court considered the legal status of an emissions trading allowance (EUA). Both parties regarded the
EUA as property (para 40), a view with which the Court concurred (para 50). 
1 See, for example, considering the broader issue of natural capital, within which ESAs are located, Mary 
Catherine O'Connor: ‘Can you put a price on nature? A Californian nonprofit thinks it can’ Guardian, Sunday 13 
March 2016.
1 Constanza et al n35, 157.
1 TEEB, n38, 12.
In the end, the TEEB, despite employing a slew of expertise in its deliberations, ended up merely 
paying lip-service to the plurality of disciplines in play, opting for a mainstream economic approach, 
reliant on the popular but highly problematic (demand-led, hypothetical) concept of ‘willingness to pay’1 as the basis for valuation. This reductionist stance misses the point, for, as Stone observes, the:‘… environmental “values” of which we are now speaking are by definition over and above those that the market is prepared to bid for: they are priceless.’1
The approach to valuation of ESAs advocated by the TEEB is at best implausible and at worst 
woefully inadequate, sidestepping the real challenge that we face which is, as Adelman puts it: ‘… to develop a notion of sustainability within rather than against nature.’1 Instead ESAs as currently 
construed arguably represent a  retrograde step as, not only are they anthropogenic in focus, they in
fact even narrow the range of human concerns addressed by foregrounding economic 
considerations at the expense of other relevant factors. The only viable – if undoubtedly socially and 
economically painful approach would be to build our economic system on respect for ecological 
limits as a constraining foundation for this aspects and all other aspects of human endeavour. So, 
can ESAs deliver this? As currently envisaged that answer has to be no: in reality what they offer is a further manifestation of ’business as usual’ though this has obvious if superficial attractions, not 
least in the creation/augmentation of existing property rights1 and associated facilitation of 
payment, offset, trade and substitution in environmental credits. Thus for all their flaws, ESAs are 
already, despite their flaws, being embraced with some enthusiasm by international institutions, 
governments, the business community, and to some degree in popular culture.1
(H) Is It Possible to Re-Orient ESAs? A Preliminary Exploration Rights-based Approaches
(SH) Property Rights, ESAs, and PES
Proponents of ESAs, such as Constanza et al. are at pains to stress that their valuation is not about 
ownership/privatisation, but rather: 
… their value in monetary units is an estimate of their benefits to society expressed in units 
that communicate with a broad audience. This can help raise awareness of the importance 
of ecosystem services to society and serve as a powerful and essential communication tool to inform better, more balanced decisions … 1
Nonetheless, once we place an economic value on something, it inevitably becomes the subject of 
property rights that are owned and traded; this inevitably and significantly alters the dynamics of the
relationships clustered around it. The TEEB for example, in alluding to ‘reinforcing rights over natural
resources’1 clearly envisaged an extension of property rights in this context - facilitated by the fact 
1 Derek R. Bell, ‘Liberal Environmental Citizenship’ (2005) Environmental Politics Vol. 14 No. 2 179, 180.
1 See, for example, George Monbiot, ‘Putting a price on the rivers and rain diminishes us all’
 Guardian 6 August 2012.
1 As for example NGOs running preserves – discussed in Vivanco, n20.
1 Discussed at length in Stone, n 8. 
1 See K. Morrow, ‘European Habitat Conservation Activities and Individual Property Rights: Law and the Meaning of LIFE’, 17 Italian American Law Digest, Vol. 17, (2009) 301.
1 See Richard A. Barnes, The Capacity of Property Rights to Accommodate Social-Ecological Resilience’ 18.1 
Ecology and Society (2013) 6.
1 See Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd n63.
1 See In re Celtic Extraction Ltd [2001] Ch 475 in which the court found that a waste management licence fell  within the definition of ‘property’ under s436 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
that many ESAs are located on land and that payments for ecosystem services (PES) will be tied to 
the existing legal rights that manifest in this regard. Thus ESAs, rather than adopting ecological 
thinking and developing conceptions of the environment as ‘provider of basic (human) needs’,1 can 
be viewed as further extending the conception of the environment as property, with damaging 
environmental and social consequences.1
Individual property rights arising in the context of PES would naturally raise concerns akin to those 
raised by of property rights in land and the environment more generally in that, while an individual 
property owner/occupier may be disposed to protect the environment,1 there is no obligation on 
them to do so.1 There are however already models in place that partially engage with the need to 
attenuate individual property rights in the name of the broader public interest in the environment. Some are primarily negative in their approach, employing various forms of coercive control – for 
example, requiring the grant of state permission in order to lawfully develop land; or rendering 
certain activities unlawful (such as the use of fertilizer in areas vulnerable to nitrate pollution) in the 
name of environmental protection. Such regimes are often contentious and generate considerable 
potential for legal challenge. PES on the other hand offers a species of positive incentivisation, which
like certain nature conservation initiatives, pays landowners/occupiers to act, or refrain from acting, 
for the benefit of the environment, albeit in the narrower context of species or habitat protection. 
However, this type of approach too has proven contentious, not least in generating property rights 
based litigation. 1 In any case it is arguable that, where PES are concerned, individual property rights 
would need to undergo considerable adaptation/only play a role within broader arrangements 
countenancing the public interest in order to be applied effectively to the governance of ESAs.1
Additionally, where PES are concerned, reasoning by extension from the approach adopted to the 
similarly artificial market-based construct of tradeable emissions permits,1 they could be construed 
as intangible property. In the alternative, PES could be treated as akin to an environmental license/permit – which may be more apposite as they are conditional upon mandated behaviours 
being observed; they would also constitute property on this view.1 There are important 
commonalities between tradeable emissions permits and environmental licences in that they offer 
individual benefit to their owners, chiefly in allowing them to operate lawfully, albeit against a 
backdrop of realising regulatory priorities in the public interest (and in the former case profiting 
from efficiency in so doing); PES are not quite analogous, in that they incentivise certain 
actions/refraining therefrom by landowners/occupiers in the public interest but this alone would not
preclude like treatment being accorded to them.
(SH) Other Human Rights, Rights for Nature, and ESAs
In terms of accommodating the broader public interest in ESAs, both the compulsive and incentivist 
approaches referred to above are strongly statist in their orientation and essentially bipartite in 
1 Monbiot n68.
1 John F. Richards, ‘Toward a Global System of Property Rights in Land’, in Edmund Burke III and Kenneth 
Pomeranz (eds.), The Environment in World History (University of California 2009).
1 See for example, International Institute for Environment and Development, ‘Markets and payments for environmental services’ online http://www.iied.org/markets-payments-for-environmental-services (accessed 
05 May 2016) 
1 Richards, n76, 58.
1 Ibid, 71.
1 Ibid, 73.
1 Mahesh Rangarajan, ‘Environmental Histories of India: Of States, Landscapes, and Ecologies’ in Burke and 
Pomeranz (eds.) n76, 238.
1 See Jane Roberts, Environmental Policy (2nd edn.) (Routledge 2011) 79-80.
1 See Vivanco, n20.
1 Ibid, 55-6.
nature, focussing on the relationship between the state as regulator/incentive provider and 
landowners/occupiers; the statist focus is ameliorated only to the extent that they effectively 
incorporate public participation. Delivering meaningful public participation would be particularly 
demanding in respect of ESAs and PES, given that many ecosystem services provide for complex, indivisible, social and/or collective goods, rather than the ‘things’ (provisioning services partially 
excepted) that form the traditional province of private property. This renders the extension of 
property rights in their traditional form into this emerging arena inherently problematic, largely 
because the collective benefits in question extend well beyond individual landowners, to 
neighbouring communities, regions, and even (in some cases) the globe, and are highly unsuitable 
subjects for individuation. 
Furthermore, when private property rights have been extended into new realms in the past, as for 
example with the introduction of individual ownership regimes to land previously held in common 
under indigenous regimes, in enclosure,1 and under colonialism.1 These developments saw the 
introduction of individual property into spheres that had previously accommodated collective 
resource holding regimes and the associated further concentration of economic benefit in the hands 
of a privileged, wealthy, minority at the expense of excluded, poor, minorities.1 These developments 
commodified1 and corporatized1 land as a resource, generating conflict and adverse social and 
environmental impacts. In the context of the former Richards points out that:
Perhaps the most typical conflict ... is that over the exploitation of a natural resource that 
has become valuable and marketable. ... Issues of stability, tradition, and nostalgia are pitted
against the excitement of new wealth and productivity in internecine elite conflict.1
In respect of the environmental problems that have arisen in this context, Rangarajan observes that: ‘The twin themes of the decline of older patterns of landuse and the degradation of ecosystems are interwoven ...’.1 It seems reasonable to infer that, as PES commodify collective ecosystem services, 
which are themselves attached to land, they have the potential to generate similar social and 
environmental conflicts. 
Likewise, there are also potential parallels to be drawn between the introduction of PES and the 
creation of both government1 and NGO-owned habitat and species preserves for study/ecotourism,1 
in employing (now largely discredited1) ‘fortress conservation’, effectively commodifying aspects of 
ecosystems: appropriating control of them; deriving income from them; and excluding 
local/indigenous communities from benefits and resources to which they traditionally had access. In 
all of these cases, the traditional human element of the ecosystems in question is effectively 
stripped out and replaced with a modern one, which can pay for the privilege.
1 Penelope Simons: ‘Selectivity in law-making: regulating extraterritorial environmental harm and human rightsviolations by transnational extractive corporations’ in Anna Grear and Louis Kotze (eds) Research Handbook on 
Human Rights and the Environment Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, (2015) points out that while international 
environmental law instruments tend to be particularly lacking in terms of compliance mechanisms in 
comparison to international human rights law regimes, at 486.
1 Ken Conca, ‘Environmental Governance After Johannesburg: From Stalled Legalization to Environmental Human Rights’ (2005) 1 Journal of International Law and International Relations 122, 133.
1 United Nations General Assembly (2007) Resolution 61/295 ‘Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf (accessed 06 May 2016).
1 M. Barelli, ‘The role of soft law in the international legal system: the case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 58.4 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2009) 957.
1 UNDRIP n87, Article 29.
1 Ibid, Article 31.
1 Ibid, Article 32.
In recent times precisely such closures have been important in promoting the use of human rights 
claims based on broadly environmental claims – a development that has, at least in part, has been 
the product of the failure of environmental law to adequately address the pressure points posed by 
the impacts of environmental degradation on people.1 This has been an essentially pragmatic course
of action, but it has proved complex and piecemeal and it is not an unalloyed success. Nonetheless, 
it is now an established part of the international legal landscape1 and it may have some application 
to the tempering the adverse impacts of ESAs on the interests of human communities and by 
extension (at least in some cases) on the natural world. At the very least, in potentially extending the
range of relevant considerations beyond the purely economic, importing certain classes of human 
rights-based argument can at least serve to open up the issues up to fuller consideration.
A potential corrective to an individual property rights focus in ESAs, and one that more accurately 
reflects the broader role and value of ecosystem services, could be achieved by employing rights 
claims in order to give legal cognisance to the fact that many of them – in particular those falling into
the regulating, supporting, and cultural categories are, wholly or in part, collective and indivisible in 
nature. Thus safeguarding the interests of the people who benefit from these ecosystem services, 
but do not own the host land, would require a novel form of engagement with human rights, 
eschewing the solely individualistic focus that dominates current human rights law in favour of a 
more collective slant. This type of approach found expression in the soft law United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples1 (UNDRIP) which (although it does not specifically 
refer to ecosystems) not only recognises the conception of collective rights in the respect of the 
environment,1 but also that these are founded upon a very different conception of the relationship 
between humanity and the environment than that which prevails in current thought. The former is 
evident in the Declaration’s acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples, as collective 
entities, to the: ‘... conservation and protection of the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources’ and consequent invocation of state obligations in this 
regard.1 The latter finds partial expression in the preambular provision which recognises that: ‘… 
that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper management of the environment’ and in the body text in 
relation to protection for indigenous:
… cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the 
manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic 
resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora [etc.] …’
and intellectual property therein;1 coupled with rights to determine resource development/use 
within their lands or territories; and associated rights of redress for interference (including express 
reference to environmental impacts) with them.1 These provisions are sufficiently broadly drafted to
1 The Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth (UDRME) online 
http://therightsofnature.org/universal-declaration/ (accessed 09 May 2016).
1 See for example, the pioneering Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (OUP 1968) and more recently 
Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Jurisprudence (2nd edn.) (Green Books 2011).
1 Stone n8, 488.
1 P. Raskin, T Banuri, G Gallopin, P Gutman, A Hammond, R Kates and R Swart, ‘Great Transition: The Promise 
and Lure of the Times Ahead’ Global Scenario Group (Stockholm Environment Institute 2002) 59
1 K. Morrow, ‘Peoples Sustainability Treaties at Rio+20: Giving Voice to the Other’ in P. Burdon and M. 
Maloney (eds.) Wild Law – In Practice (Taylor and Francis 2014).
1 Peoples Sustainability Treaties (2012) online https://sustainabilitytreaties.org/  (accessed 06 May 2016).
1 http://therightsofnature.org/rights-of-nature-tribunal-paris/ (accessed 09 May 2016).
accommodate all classes of ecosystem services and, read together, they arguably combine to situate 
our understanding of those services in a more realistic social and environmental fashion than an 
individualistic, property-rights style model can ever do. Nonetheless, on one level it is possible to 
argue that the UNDRIP approach is still essentially anthropocentric in its rights-based approach to 
humans and nature; this interpretation is not however borne out when considered against the 
background of indigenous cosmologies, as expressed for instance in the 2010 Universal Declaration 
of the Rights of Mother Earth (UDRME)1, the preamble of which states that: ‘… we are all part of 
Mother Earth, an indivisible, living community of interrelated and interdependent beings with a common destiny’. This view, founded on a common feature of many indigenous cosmologies, 
crucially belies the paradigm of mastery, breaking down artificial distinctions between humanity and 
nature. This type of approach has also played a key role in pioneering theoretical work, both 
philosophical1 and jurisprudential, challenging the way in which we regard the relationship between 
humanity and the environment. In the latter category, Stone famously made the case for changing 
the way law treats the natural world by extending rights claims to it, arguing that:
… the notion of something having a “right” … brings into the legal system a flexibility and open-endedness that no series of specifically stated legal rules … can capture. Part of the reason is that “right[s]” … have meaning – vague but forceful – in the ordinary language and 
the force of these meanings, inevitably infused with our thought, becomes part of the context against which the “legal language” of our contemporary “legal rules” is interpreted.”1
The extension of legal rights to nature could provide a further counterbalance to naked human 
economic interest in the conception of ecosystem services. This type of approach was argued for in 
the Great Transition Report, which sought to promote a ‘rights revolution’ in defence of the 
biosphere by invoking the ‘inviolable rights of people and nature’ through developing a ‘natural communities and ecosystems’ based approach toward rights for nature.1 The idea of rights for 
nature continues to be very much a live issue for debate and activism in the international arena, 
expressed for example in the Rights of Mother Earth Treaty (part of the Peoples Sustainability 
Treaties (PSTs) initiative begun in the run up to the UNCSD in 20121) which begins by recognising 
the: ‘inherent rights of ‘Mother Earth and all ecosystems and species of which she is composed’;1  
and in the  ongoing work of the International Rights of Nature Tribunal1 (itself rooted in the UDRME).
(H) The Limits to Rights: The Question of Responsibility
Even were we to develop a more nuanced, less individualistically focussed conception of rights in 
respect of ecosystem services and to extend rights coverage to nature itself, it is arguable that this 
would still be insufficient to fully address the issues raised by ESAs. The less prominent, but 
emergent question of human responsibility may offer an interesting complementary avenue which 
1 See, for example, The International Council on Human Rights Policy, ‘Taking Duties Seriously:Individual Duties in International Human Rights Law – A Commentary’ (1999) online  
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/10/103_report_en.pdf (accessed 20 April 2016).
1 Notably in a civil society context, see the 1997 Inter Action Council, A Universal Declaration of Human 
Responsibilities http://interactioncouncil.org/universal-declaration-human-responsibilities (accessed 20 April 
2016).
1 Stephen T. Trudgill, Barriers to a better environment: What stops us solving environmental problems? 
(Belhaven Press 1990) 13.
1 Online at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13178&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
accessed 29 April 2016.
1 Article 2(f) UNDME n92.
1 Online  
https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fsustainabilitytreaties.files.wordpress.com%2F2012%2F0
5%2Fpeoples-sustainability-treaty-on-a-charter-of-universal-responsibility-draft-for-rio20.pdf (accessed 20 
April 2016). 
1 Ibid, principle 1
1 Ibid, principle 5.
could be pursued to this end. Whilst the notion of legally embodying individual human 
responsibilities tends to have fairly limited reach in the current, state-oriented human rights cannon,
1 it occasionally becomes a live issue even in mainstream human rights debate.1 Employing the 
notion of responsibility in an environmental context tends to be viewed rather more enthusiastically,
rooting the notion in both moral and practical terms:
… we, the most powerful species on earth, have the capability to destroy, create, modify and
otherwise affect the ecosystems of the planet, their life forms and our own future’.1
Invoking individual and collective human responsibility towards the environment would place a limit 
on the pursuit of rights, responding to the unique position of humans as ecosystem actors in respect 
of other humans and other life forms. Such an approach is not without precedent, for example, the 
moral and ethical need to exercise ecological responsibility qua future generations of humans 
(though not in terms of nature in its own right) featured in the 1997 UNESCO Declaration on the 
Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations.1 Article 4 of this document,on the ‘Preservation of life on Earth’, states that: 
… Each generation inheriting the Earth temporarily should take care to use natural resources
reasonably and ensure that life is not prejudiced by harmful modifications of the ecosystems
and that scientific and technological progress in all fields does not harm life on Earth. 
The idea of human responsibility tends to be more prominently endorsed by environmental activists 
than their human rights counterparts and it has re-emerged in Article 3 of the UDRME, which 
delineates broad-ranging and detailed obligations applicable to all human beings to: ’respect, 
protect, conserve and where necessary, restore the integrity, of the vital ecological cycles, processes 
and balances of Mother Earth’.1 PSTs too considered this issue, notably in the Charter of Universal 
Responsibilities (CUR)1 which advocated an expansion of  human rights-based approaches that 
recognised the ‘interdependences’ between ‘humankind and the biosphere’1 and an ‘.... awareness of our shared responsibilities to the planet’ as a ‘condition for the survival and progress of humankind’.1 These days we can ill-afford to scoff at such thinking as mere idealism – instead, in 
light of the enmeshed environmental crises we face and the potential existential threats that they 
pose, it should be viewed an expression of realism.
Were ESAs to be engaged with through a sustainability lens, then their environmental importance 
would be the prime consideration, the base line against which their social and economic importance 
1 From Emily Dickinson, ’There came a Wind like a Bugle’ in Alice Oswald (ed.) The Thunder Mutters: 101 
Poems for the Planet (Faber and Faber 2005), 24.
1 Kaldis n22, 87.
would be assessed and invoking broader rights talk in this regard could help to achieve the 
reorientation necessary to render them ecologically literate and effective.
(H) Concluding Thoughts
All things have their time, and the shift from the newly recognised Anthropocene to what may be 
termed the biocene may well be inevitable; such a transition, instituted by damaging the ecosystem 
services that promote human flourishing and breaching Earth System tipping points, is likely to occur
in less than the blink of an eye in comparison to that between other epochs. The role of humanity in 
the era to come remains to be seen, for while life will continue to flourish, albeit perhaps in very 
different ways, humanity may not. As Emily Dickinson puts it:
How much can come
And much can go,And yet abide the World!’ 1
At least for now, our destiny is (at least partly) in our own hands. The continued flourishing of 
humanity will however require nothing less than a new ecological enlightenment. This cannot take the form of an anti-anthropocentric model – in light of humanity’s distinctive position within the 
biosphere this would be at best implausible (if not impossible1) – but must rather entail the adoption
of a new world view. This must be ecologically contextualised and fully understand what it means to 
be human; embedded in the environment but also in a unique position to shape and influence it - 
and sees us act accordingly.
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